Introduction
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The academic community of economics may be explored through the observation of the editorial activities of scholars engaged as members on the boards of editors of relevant scientific journals, and through the analysis of the structural properties of the network generated by the editorial activities of the members of the boards of these journals. While a lot of literature on the sociology of science uses data on editorial boards for empirical research (e.g. Braun 2004 ), starting at least from the seminal work of Merton and Zuckerman (1971) ; only recently these data, starting from Baccini (2009) , have been explored with network analysis techniques (Baccini 2009; Cronin 2009; Baccini and Barabesi 2010; Ni and Ding 2010; Baccini and Barabesi 2011; Cabanac 2012) .
Traditionally, the main function of editorial boards was to determine which articles were appropriate for publication. In the last two or three decades this function has changed: the spread of the anonymous referee process allows editorial boards to concentrate on selecting and evaluating referees. In every case they act as "gatekeepers of science" (Crane 1967) , "holding the fate of so many papers and so many careers"; they are "a small group, although growing in numbers as specialized journals continue to launch. These people are the chaperones of submitted papers, seeing the manuscripts through the peer-review process and ultimately deciding whether a paper gets published in the journal" (Powell 2010) . They control "the system of manuscript evaluation and selection" occupying a powerful strategic position in the collective activity of science (Braun 2004; Braun, Diospatonyi et al. 2007) ; they "exert a special influence on the orchestration of the international research activity" ; and they contribute to shape the landscape of research in a discipline by encouraging or suppressing various directions through the definition of the editorial policies of their journals Braun, Diospatonyi et al. 2007; Hames 2007; Fogarty and Liao 2009) . The role of editorial boards members in this respect could be stronger in the social sciences and humanities rather than in hard sciences. Merton and Zuckerman (1971) suggested that the role of editors in this respect is stronger when the degree of consensus of scholars about a scientific paradigm is weak, as in many subfields of social sciences and humanities. According to related studies, the selection of editors in the fields where the consensus is weak, tends to reflect particularistic criteria such as affiliation or the university from which a scholar graduated, rather than universalistic ones (Yoels 1974) .
From a different point of view, scientific journals and their publishers are interested in assuring the presence of distinguished scholars on their boards. A cornerstone of the scientific ethos is that the selection of the editorial board members should be based on their scholarly achievements (Bedeian, Van Fleet et al. 2009 ). The competition between journals for talented scholars results in a partial overlapping of their editorial boards. If each member of an editorial board may influence in some measure the editorial policy of his/her journal, journals with overlapping boards may have partial overlapping editorial policies; or partially overlapping or complementary scopes. We will not be concerned with direct observations of the editorial policies adopted by the boards of journals, and of their contents -fields, subjects and methods covered. We will infer considerations about the similarity of editorial policies and consequently of journal contents by observing the "interlocking More in general, the interlocking editorship analysis permits us to explore the existence of separate schools of thought, methodologies, or patterns of research characterizing the scientific community under scrutiny. This last feature is particularly relevant for economics where the existence of different schools of thought, characterized by different methodologies, instruments or visions is a well known phenomenon. The identification of different schools is generally made, so to speak, in reference to the contents of science, as for example when the Austrian school is distinguished from the neoclassical one, or when heterodox economists are distinguished from mainstream ones. The classification of macroeconomists in freshwater and saltwater, although defined in reference to the university affiliation of scholars, is ultimately based on the different approaches to macroeconomics that are used in different universities. The interlocking editorship analysis permits to work at an exploratory level where the identification of groups is made without any reference to the contents of science. The existence of the different groups identified through network analysis may be interpreted not only from a content-based point of view, but also from an academic-power point of view. Baccini (2009) for example interpreted the interlocking editorship networks in Italian economic journals as the result of the existence of academic cliques aiming to control disciplinary fields at a national level, rather than the result of different approaches to economics.
The scientific community surrounding economic journals is represented as an affiliation or dual-mode network where the vertices are divided into two sets (scholars and journals) and the affiliation connects the vertices from the two different sets only (Wasserman and Faust 1994; de Nooy, Mrvar et al. 2005) . Dual-mode networks characterize some informetric phenomena: the author-paper links result in co-authorship/publication networks; the source-citation links result in reference-citation networks. In our case, the event of affiliation (being a member of the editorial board) connects a scholar to an economic journal. The duality specifically refers to the two alternative perspectives: on the one hand different editors are linked by their affiliation to the same journal, and on the other two journals are linked by the editors who are on their boards. Therefore, there are two different ways to view the affiliation network: as one of editors linked by journals (networks of co-membership), or as one of journals linked by editors (interlocking of events). It is possible to study the dual-mode network as a whole, or to transform it into two single-mode networks focusing only on the analysis of the network of editors or of journals.
The centre and periphery in the interlocking editorship network
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There is no evidence regarding the roles of different kinds of editors in the editorial process, with the only exception of editor-in-chief (Yoels 1974) . A same position such as associate editor or managing editor may often entail very different roles for different journals. As a consequence a very broad notion of editor is adopted, covering all the individuals listed as editor, co-editor, member of the editorial board or of the advisory editorial board (Hodgson and Rothman 1999; Baccini, Barabesi et al. 2009; Baccini and Barabesi 2011; Cabanac 2012) . journals on the boundaries with other disciplines with only a minor emphasis in economics (e.g.
American Historical Review or Transportation Journal).
A main concern in our analysis is to distinguish between the economic journals which have a central position in the network and those in the periphery. As suggested by Wasserman and Faust (1994) , three centrality measures for each journal in the network may be adopted. The simplest measure for the centrality of a journal is represented by its degree: indeed, the more ties a journal has to other journals, the more central is its position in the network. For example, the Pacific Economic Review is linked with 124 journals, while Journal of Development and Economic Policies is linked with solely one. Hence, the first is more central in the network than the second. In addition, the normalized degree of a journal is the ratio of its degree to the maximum possible degree (i.e. the number of journals minus 1). Thus, the Pacific Economic Review is linked with about 16.6% of the other journals in the network, while Statistical Modelling is linked with only 0.001%. Table A1 contains the degree and the normalized degree for the journals considered. The second centrality measure is given by closeness centrality, which is based on the distance between a journal and all the other journals. In the network analysis, the distance between two vertices is usually based on so-called geodesic distance. Geodesic is the shortest path between two vertices, while its length is the number of lines in the geodesic ( (Wasserman and Faust 1994) .
Hence, the closeness centrality of a journal is the number of journals (linked to this journal by a path) divided by the sum of all the distances (between the journal and the linked journals). The basic idea is that a journal is central if its board can quickly interact with all the other boards.
Journals occupying a central location with respect to closeness can be very effective in communicating information (sharing research, sharing papers, deciding editorial policies) to other journals. Table A1 contains the closeness centrality for economic journals.
The third considered measure is the so-called betweenness centrality. The idea behind the index is that similar editorial aims between two non-adjacent journals might depend on other journals in the network, especially on those journals lying on the paths between the two. The other journals potentially might have some control over the interaction between two non-adjacent journals. Hence, a journal is more central in this respect if it is an important intermediary in links between other journals. From a formal perspective, the betweenness centrality of a journal is the proportion of all paths between pairs of other journals that include this journal. Table A1 contains the betweenness centrality of the economic journals. For example, the Pacific Economic Review is in about 4% of the paths linking all other journals in the network. It is interesting to note that in the statistical journal network, the two journals with higher betweenness are each in about 12% of the paths linking all other journals (Baccini, Barabesi et al. 2008; Baccini, Barabesi et al. In press) .
Groups of journals in the network
We can now consider the strength of the ties linking journals: the value of a line linking two journals is the number of editors sitting on the board of the two journals linked by that line (Wasserman and Faust 1994) . Table III shows the distribution of line values: 74.6% of the links are generated by journals sharing only one editor and about 94% are generated by journals sharing three or less editors. In social network analysis it is usual to consider lines with higher value to be more important since they are less personal and more institutional (de Nooy, Mrvar et al. 2005 ). In the case of the journal network, the basic idea is very simple: the editorial proximity between two Starting from this basis it is possible to define cohesive subgroups, i.e. subsets of journals among which there are relatively strong ties. In a valued network a cohesive subgroup is a subset of vertices among which ties have a value higher than a given threshold. In our case, a cohesive subgroup of journals is a set of journals sharing a number of editors equal or higher than the threshold. In our interpretation, a cohesive subgroup of journals is a subgroup with a similar editorial policy, belonging to the same subfield of the discipline or sharing a common methodological approach. Following de Nooy et al. (2005) , cohesive subgroups are identified as weak components in m-slices, i.e. subsets for which the threshold value is at least m.
As previously remarked, the network of statistical journals is not compact: there is a big component of 670 journals and all the others are isolated. The search for cohesive subgroups strengthens this path: fixing a minimum value of threshold to the big component reduces to 474 journals, 13 components emerge of 2-4 journals, and the isolated journals grow to 242. With the big component reduces to 284 journals and isolated journals grow to 369. With higher threshold value, the network gives rise to components worthy of being noticed here.
In particular we focused our attention on the weak components emerging in 6-slices network.
It is possible to isolate 41 components including 176 journals. We comment, first, on the three weak components with the biggest number of journals . Weak components in 6-slices network with more than three journals (the dimension of vertices is proportional to betweenness centrality) Figure 6 contains the weak components with three journals. Again in clockwise, on the right there is a group of law and economics journals; then a group of business history journals; the already mentioned group of public choice journal; three journals devoted to the study of the economics of new technology; a component containing three review of development published by Oxford University; and finally three Brazilian economic journals. 
The network of editors
We can now consider the editors sitting at the editorial tables of the economic journals. The average number of seats per journal turned out to be 28.9, while the average number of seats occupied by each scholar (i.e. the mean rate of participation) is 1.35. The distribution of editorship held by scholars, that is the distribution of scholars per seats held, is described in Table IV. 12,742 out of 15,991 serve as editor of only one journals; 3,249 scholars are instead multiple editors. Only a small minority of scholars, less than 1%, sits in more than four different editorial boards. It is very difficult to interpret these data. From the point of view of academic reputation, multiple editorship could be considered as a sign of distinction for those scholars serving in a plurality of editorial boards (Rost and Frey 2011) . The same logic, even if reversed, applies to the ranking of academic institutions on the basis of their representation on the editorial boards of top journals (Kaufman 1984; Gibbons and Fish 1991; Braun, Diospatonyi et al. 2007 ). The list of multiple directors is therefore the list of the most esteemed scholars in economics.
From a more critical perspective, the attention could be focused on the editorial power of multiple editors. A first question concerns the degree of connectedness amongst multiple directors.
If we consider, for the sake of simplicity, the 32 editors with more than 7 editorial positions, we can see in Figure 7 that all these editors are connected in a single network. In Figure 7 a line linking two vertices means that the two scholars sit together on one editorial board; the width of each line is proportional to the number of editorial boards in which the scholars sit together. The density of the network between multiple directors is 0.28: that is a quarter is realized of the maximum number of links in a network with 32 vertices. The diameter of the network is 4, that is the longest shortest path between two vertices is 4. 6 The average distance among reachable pairs of vertices is only 1.99. This is a very small world. 5 In the network 91 lines have value 1; 25 value 2; 14 value 3; 6 value 2; and 2 value 5.
These editors, according to our hypothesis, have some power in shaping the editorial policies of the journals where they sit. It is therefore instructive to see how many journals are connected through this small group of multiple directors. Figure 8 draws the journals connected by this group of multiple editors. This small group of multiple editors influences 166 journals, which is about 23% of all relevant economic journals published in economics. 
Conclusive remarks
The affiliation network generated by scholars serving on the editorial boards of economic journal is explored through network analysis technique. Editorial activity is considered a duty for scholars; an invitation to sit on an editorial board of a journal is usually considered a signal of recognition by the scientific community. When a scholar sits on an editorial board, he or she acquires some power in the definition of the editorial policy of his/her journal. Consequently, if the same scholar sits on the editorial board of two journals, those journals may have some common elements in their editorial policies. Our working hypothesis is that it is possible to assess the proximity of the editorial policies of two scientific journals through the numbers of links generated by common editors sitting on their boards. The phenomenon of a same editor serving in the editorial boards of two different journals is called interlocking editorship. This is analogous with interlocking directorship which is the phenomenon of a same person sitting on the boards of directors of two different firms.
The editorial board members of the economic journals generated a very compact network where about 90% of the journals considered are linked directly or indirectly. If we consider the number of common editors as an indicator of proximity, it is possible to individuate into this network many different groups of journals. These different groups can be characterized in reference, so to speak, to their scientific contents. In economics competing visions or approaches to economic research prompt scholars to endorse different languages and visions about the correct view of how to conduct research. The groups of journals that emerged in the network analysis may be identified in relation to different approaches to economic scholarship: mainstream macroeconomics; mainstream microeconomics; public choice, evolutionary economics etc. The scholars holding multiple editorship are also identified as a small group of 32 multiple directors, serving as editor in as many as 166 journals. 
